Balancing Conflicting Interests During Pregnancy: Ultrasound v. Reality by HADJIGEORGIOU
[2010] COLR 
 
BALANCING CONFLICTING INTERESTS DURING PREGNANCY: 
ULTRASOUND v. REALITY                                                                                  
Anthanasia Hadjigeorgiou *                                                                                        
ABSTRACT                                                             
The article examines whether it is morally correct and legally possible to police a pregnant 
woman’s behaviour in order to protect the foetus. The first part of the paper discusses 
whether a pregnant woman should be forced to have a caesarean section; it proposes a 
‘modified competency test’ which begins with the rebuttable presumption that the competent 
woman can refuse the operation if she offers at least one reason for her decision. The second 
part of the paper asks what should be the law’s reaction in cases where the pregnant addict 
causes serious injury or death to the foetus. There can be a criminal prosecution, civil 
liability or taking the baby from the mother as soon as she gives birth. Finally, a ‘middle 
solution’ is proposed which encourages women to come forward so that they can be 
rehabilitated. In both debates the pregnant woman should be the one who decides about her 
own future and society should only have a residual role; only this method will adequately 
protect both the mother’s and the foetus’ interests. 
 
 
A INTRODUCTION 
 
The patient’s right to control her body is so well established, at least in theory, that it has 
almost become a mantra.  If a paranoid, schizophrenic man can decide whether he wants his 
leg amputated or not
1
 then all competent people have the right to decide whether anyone can 
touch their body, no matter the consequences.  This is both legally and morally correct; 
however, does the same principle apply to pregnant women?  In particular, should a pregnant 
woman be able to deny a life-saving (for her and her foetus) caesarean section?  The law on 
the importance of patient autonomy seems settled; but as Lord Mustill stated in AG’s 
Reference (No.3 of 1994), 
2
 ‘[t]he relationship was one of bond, not identity.’3  The mother 
and the foetus were two distinct organisms living symbiotically, not a single organism with 
two aspects.  The mother’s leg was part of the mother; the foetus was not.  Clearly, autonomy 
is not the only consideration to be taken into account in these circumstances. 
The debate largely rests on whether a pregnant woman is the only person who can 
decide what happens to her body or whether society, in the voice of the doctor or the judge, 
has a say as well.  The question is a difficult one: on one hand, pregnant women should not 
be treated differently than anyone else.  They make sacrifices for the foetus they carry inside 
them that no one knows of.  If they are not willing to make this ultimate sacrifice, that is their 
right and they should not be morally blamed or legally punished.  On the other hand, they 
consented to the risks of pregnancy, including a caesarean section when they decided not to 
have an abortion, thus establishing a moral obligation towards the foetus. 
However, the question of a forced caesarean section cannot be seen in isolation from 
other maternity questions.  If society has the right to trespass the woman’s right of autonomy 
and self-determination during the delivery of the child, then it arguably has the right to 
impose some limits on what she can do during the gestation period as well.  This raises 
another series of difficult issues: even though it is easy to say that a woman should not be 
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using heroin while pregnant, it is more difficult to consider an addicted woman who has been 
turned down by the rehabilitation centre due to limited resources as morally culpable.  
Moreover, if we decide that such behaviour is both immoral towards the foetus and society’s 
values, is it also worth punishing?  If our aim is to punish the woman for failing to meet 
society’s standards, then post-delivery punishment might be legitimate; but if we are trying to 
protect the foetus, punishment is simply unproductive, unless we accept that it could 
potentially have a deterrent effect to future pregnant women.  The first part of this essay will 
deal with forced caesarean section and the second part with society’s right to interfere during 
the nine-month gestation period. 
 
 
B THE CAESAREAN SECTION DEBATE  
 
1 The Pregnant Woman’s Self-Determination 
 
Following the case of St George’s NHS Trust v S ,4 the law finally seems settled: everyone, 
including a woman carrying a viable foetus, has the right to decide how her body is treated.  
If that compromises hers and her baby’s life, it is an acceptable price to be paid for ensuring 
the patient’s autonomy.  As it was stated in Re MB (An Adult: Medical Treatment) ‘the 
mother may indeed later regret the outcome, but the alternative would be an unwanted 
invasion of the right of the woman to make a decision.’5  There is no certain definition of 
autonomy; all we can say is that it encompasses the right to determine by ourselves what we 
want to happen to something as intimate as our body.  In Sperling’s words, the pregnant 
woman scenario is the ‘test case for the protection of the woman’s right of self-determination 
in the eyes of the law.’6  Even in the developed world, one in every 10,000 women dies as a 
result of a caesarean section.
7
  20-45% of women who go through a caesarean section have an 
operation-associated infection while the chances of suffering from pulmonary embolism and 
dying are nine times higher than with normal vaginal delivery.
8
  If a woman is not allowed to 
decide whether to go through such risks, then the whole concept of autonomy must be unreal.  
 These statistics suggest that caesarean section is a risky operation; yet, it is the most 
popular operation in the UK with women increasingly asking for it themselves.
9
  It is thus 
likely that feminists exaggerate the dangers of the operation.  As Dr. Kalakoutis states: ‘Yes 
there is a risk in a [c]aesarean [s]ection, just like there is a risk in a normal delivery and just 
like there is risk in a nail removal operation.’10  Moreover, one could argue that a caesarean 
section does not compromise the woman’s autonomy since she considered these risks and 
consented to them when she decided not to have an abortion: she made an informed choice in 
keeping the baby and that included the chance of having to go through the operation to bring 
the baby safe into the world.  16% of pregnant women who give birth in the UK have a  
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caesarean section and she could well have been one of them.
11
  Therefore, the self-
determination argument fails to capture the whole picture as ‘a unique situation: a situation 
where there is a particular need to examine what is meant by autonomous choice, given that 
the woman has made a decision to continue with the pregnancy.’12  The traditional 
understanding of autonomy, as the ‘trump card beating all the other principles,13 creates an all 
or nothing approach and in an attempt to completely protect the woman’s rights, it 
completely ignores not only the foetal rights that are at stake, but society’s duty to protect 
human life in general.  
 Sperling
14
 mentions the possibility of a woman who did not impliedly consent to 
caesarean section because she never really had a chance to have an abortion.  She might have 
kept the foetus not as a result of a deliberate choice but because of lack of access to 
therapeutic abortion, cultural, social, familial and personal constraints.  With due respect, this 
author finds this argument insulting to all the women who have a legitimate reason for 
denying a caesarean section: if Sperling’s argument was accepted, it would lead to a double 
tragedy.  Just because the woman was unfortunate enough to be forced to go through a 
pregnancy, that does not give her the right to kill the foetus at a later, in fact the latest, stage.   
Two wrongs simply do not make a right and if she does not want the foetus, she can give it 
up for adoption, not kill it by claiming that she has a right to do so by appealing to her self-
determination as a human being. 
 Dworkin gives a useful example of the interaction between paternalism and 
autonomous decisions.
 15
  Ancient Greek mythology said that when Odysseus was passing by 
the island of the Sirens, he ordered his men to tie him to a pole and ignore all his later orders 
to approach the island until they could no longer hear the Sirens’ song.  This is because their 
song would lure him onto the island, where he would face definite death.  It could be argued 
that even if he had not given such an order, the sailors would be justified in acting 
paternalistically and ignoring his orders because they would be protecting his life, thus 
ensuring his long term autonomy.  After all, ‘autonomy is of no value to a dead person.’16  
Although this is a good example where paternalism and autonomy align, it cannot be equated 
with the pregnant woman scenario.  It can be assumed that long term survival was part of 
Odysseus’ plan but in the case of the pregnant woman, the exercise of paternalism could 
result in a quality of life that the woman considers insufficient in reflecting a satisfactory 
understanding of herself.
17
  Arguably, survival is not worth much if you do not have 
something worth surviving for. 
 
  
2 The Discrimination Argument 
 
The autonomy argument is supported by feminists who argue that pregnant women, like 
every other human being, have a right to control their body and that forcing them to go 
through the operation, is discriminatory.
18
  However, the discrimination argument is flawed 
in that it ignores the fact that the pregnant woman is treated differently precisely because she 
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is different from everyone else.  She carries a viable human being inside her and she has the 
moral, if not legal obligation to protect it.  
 The classic feminist argument is that the law does not oblige a father to go through a 
kidney transplant operation to save his child and neither should it oblige a woman to go 
through an equally dangerous operation to deliver a foetus that is not even considered an 
entity under the law.
19
  However, this is not a question of legal obligations but of moral ones.   
The question that should be asked is: is a father morally obliged to give a kidney to save his 
child’s life?  This depends on a number of factors: what are the risks of the operation, is there 
anyone else to take care of his other children and bring money to the family while he is 
recovering from the operation, what are the chances of the operation succeeding etc.  Only he 
can assess the advantages and disadvantages of such a decision because it reflects his 
understanding of life as a human being and when he does, his decision is respected.  One 
wonders why a pregnant woman is to be treated differently.  One could argue that the 
pregnant woman and the father are not like situations.  A father is not obliged to go through 
the operation because he might have conflicting moral obligations and only he can decide 
between them.  A pregnant woman on the other hand, should have a legal obligation to 
deliver the child because her reasons for not wanting to go through with the operation are 
purely selfish: she is allowing her child to die because she is afraid of needles,
20
 because she 
believes that a blood transfusion would compromise her religion
21
 or because believes in 
nature taking its course.
22
  However, the picture is not always black and white: is the woman 
who refuses to have a caesarean section because she will return to Nigeria where the 
necessary equipment for a possible second caesarean section
23
 will not be available being 
selfish, or merely exercising the right given by her very existence, to reproduce?  The 
argument of culpability being based on selfishness is unpersuasive because the pregnant 
woman, like the father in this example, has to balance conflicting moral obligations.  After 
all, arguably the sacrifice of a child to prove one’s devotion to God24 is anything but selfish.   
Since there are situations where the pregnant woman will have to balance conflicting moral 
interests as well, she should be given a chance to do so and her choice should be respected. 
 It has been argued that the biggest danger in treating women differently from anyone 
else is fear of the slippery slope:
25
 once women are denied the right to refuse treatment at 
delivery, there are logically no lengths to which doctors and courts can go to protect human 
life.  However, the caesarean section scenario does not include a slippery slope danger at all. 
We are already at the bottom of the slope and the law can demand no more.
26
  This is not 
necessarily a bad thing; after all, strict liability is not a foreign idea in the Anglo-American 
legal system.  Sperling
27
 argues that the standard of reasonable care is the only relevant 
standard in the parent-child relationship and is a constant one.  Since it is not a standard of 
perfection, it cannot demand from a pregnant woman to risk her life for her baby.  However, 
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logically this argument must be wrong.  The parent’s obligation towards the child is affected 
by the child’s dependency on the parent.  The parent might be able to leave a child to play in 
the park alone when he is 12, but not when he is two; similarly, he might not have an 
obligation to hold his 15 year-old son by the hand in a busy place but he has the obligation to 
do so if the son is severely disabled or blind.  One’s responsibility is relative to the other’s 
dependency.  If one accepts the argument that the foetus is the most vulnerable type of a child 
(albeit morally if not legally), then caesarean section cannot be rejected on a slippery slope 
argument: since the foetus is at its most vulnerable state, the mother cannot be asked to do 
anything more than what she is being asked to do now. 
 
 
3 The Foetus and the Law 
 
A foetus is not considered a legal entity under the law, thus it does not possess any legal 
rights.  However, this does not preclude the possibility of the foetus being owed some moral 
rights because it was given a moral personality by the pregnant woman when she decided to 
carry on with the pregnancy.  This counter-argument to autonomy is supported by a number 
of judicial statements.  Lord Justice Judge in St George’s NHS Trust v S 28made this point 
clearly when he said that ‘what else it may be, a 36 week foetus is not nothing: if viable it is 
not lifeless and is certainly human.’29  The most obvious example of the law recognising 
some rights in the foetus is the prohibition of abortion in the majority of cases after the 24
th
 
week of pregnancy.
30
  This is precisely because around the 24
th
 week the foetus becomes 
viable and society feels that it must protect the right to life of a future human being.  If the 
law is willing to trump the mother’s autonomous decision in the context of abortion to protect 
the foetus (unless her health is at risk or there is a significant risk that the foetus will be 
severely handicapped), then it is at least arguable that it has the same right in the case of a 
forced caesarean section.  Additionally, if policy arguments can be used to vitiate a freely 
given consent where harm is likely to occur,
31
 then one should at least consider the possibility 
that society can sidestep the woman’s non-consent on the same grounds.32  These arguments 
are even stronger if we consider that we are not only protecting the moral interests of the 
foetus but the future legal interests of the person that this foetus will become.  As Dr. 
Kalakoutis
33
 argues, ‘[i]sn’t it the same as injuring someone in order to prevent him from 
murdering a third person?  My conscience is clean.’34  Dr. Kalakoutis’s reaction reflects the 
argument that as technology progresses, so should our understanding of morality.  When the 
foetus is removed from the ‘secrecy of the womb’35 through ultrasound, it not only acquires 
social recognition, but it also enhances the doctor’s perception that he is dealing with a 
second patient.  It will thus be my position throughout this essay that despite the fact that the 
foetus’ rights cannot always trump the rights of the mother, similarly it cannot be argued that 
the mother can decide what she will do without consideration towards the foetus simply on 
the basis of autonomy.  
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4  The Pregnant Woman’s Perspective 
 
The third argument frequently presented by feminists, is that a pregnant woman knows better 
than her doctors; the intimate relationship she has developed with the foetus simply points to 
the fact that a natural delivery would be the best way to go about things.
36
 Sperling also 
argues that as a consequence of a forced caesarean section, the mother’s relationship with her 
future baby might be compromised because the baby ‘made’ her do something she did not 
want to or because it did not rise up to the expectation of the natural delivery she wanted to 
have.
37
  However, both of these arguments are unpersuasive.  Most of us would blame a 
doctor for forcing a woman to have a mastectomy when he knows full well that she can have 
chemotherapy instead, because it is a very personal decision that only impacts on her body.  
But with the risk of sounding paternalistic, this is one of the situations where the doctor truly 
knows best – if the umbilical cord is tied around the foetus’ neck or if the foetus is not in the 
right position in order to be delivered naturally, it is a question of fact and not of gut feeling.  
As for the argument that the mother will be disappointed by her baby, this again cannot stand.  
Parents sometimes expect things that their children simply cannot deliver: it’s wrong for a 
mother’s relationship with her child to be negatively influenced because the child is not as 
good an athlete as she wanted him to be; and it’s preposterous to argue that a mother is 
negatively predisposed against her child because as a baby it cried more than she expected.  
Why is the mode of delivery any less absurd of an example? 
 Perhaps the most powerful argument against caesarean section is the consequentialist 
argument.  The phrase ‘forced caesarean section’ has been repeated so many times, that it no 
longer makes an impact, yet its effects are profound.  The woman will presumably be 
protesting strongly before the delivery and after it she will need time to recover from an 
operation that not only injured her physically but also psychologically.  It is important to bear 
in mind what this process does to the woman’s trust towards the medical profession.  It is 
thus likely that the next time she becomes pregnant; she will prefer to deliver the baby at 
home, putting hers and the foetus’ life at risk.38  It is perhaps easy to exaggerate this 
argument: Dr Savage, in her 35 years as a doctor, only saw two cases in which the woman 
absolutely refused caesarean section.
39
  Similarly, Dr. Kalakoutis in his 30 years of 
experience in Cyprus only saw one such case.  However, these numerically limited cases are 
likely to be overexploited by the press, giving the impression that this is a frequent 
phenomenon, thus frightening women away from hospitals.  Dr. Savage gives an example of 
the dangers inherent in such paternalist attitudes: the patient was a 16 year-old woman who 
did not speak English and her husband (a devout Muslim) would not consent to a caesarean 
section.  When it became apparent that she could not deliver the baby naturally he agreed to 
the operation but by that time the baby had died because it could not come out of her 
unusually small pelvis.  In the following years she delivered six healthy babies with 
caesarean section.  Dr. Savage concludes: ‘If we had gone to court, would he have tried to 
have his wife deliver at home the next time and perhaps die from a ruptured uterus?  An 
unanswerable question.’40  If he did, not only would the doctors have indirectly compromised 
her life, but the life of every other pregnant woman in a similar situation who read the story.  
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Therefore, even if one has the foetus’s best interests in mind rather than the mother’s, a 
forced caesarean section is simply not the answer.  
 
 
5  What Direction Should the Law Take? 
 
As illustrated above, at the centre of all these arguments lie two conflicting interests: the 
interest of the foetus to live and the interest of the mother to exercise her fundamental right as 
a human being and determine her actions.  The law today (at least in theory) sees autonomy 
as the principle that should always prevail.  However, ‘the current emphasis upon the need to 
uphold autonomy is as dangerous as the previous emphasis upon the value of the unborn 
child.’41  This is because no principle can always be supreme over the other; a more subtle 
test balancing the two principles is appropriate. 
 Both sides have equally strong ethical arguments but medical ethics have to be 
applied in real world situations.  Initially the argument whether a foetus lives or dies should 
depend on the mother’s reasons sounds appealing.  However, it must be rejected both on 
ethical and on practical grounds.  If the test tries to determine whether the mother is being 
selfish, as was suggested in the kidney transplant example, her right of autonomy is 
completely ignored: autonomy is after all worth nothing if it is only exercised when it is 
compatible with the doctor’s, the judge’s or the majority’s opinion.  On more practical 
grounds, this criterion is problematic because it simply cannot be applied fairly.  Most 
women only find out that they must go through a caesarean section after the contractions 
have started, when they are already exhausted from the long hours and the pain.  A decision 
will have to be taken quickly, sometimes over the phone, even more frequently with the 
woman’s opinion not even being heard because she does not have a lawyer.42  In cases where 
the woman’s voice cannot be heard, the doctors are likely to give false or misleading 
information, leading the judge to decide in favour of the forced operation.  For example, St 
George’s NHS Trust v S 43 was heard during the lunch break and the court was falsely told 
that the woman was in labour for 24 hours and that ‘every minute counted,’44  This trend is 
reflected in the fact that 86% of the cases that have been heard by a judge resulted in a 
caesarean section.
45  
Dr. Kalakoutis’s statement when asked what he would do when a woman 
did not consent to the operation was clear: ‘I would go ahead with it, since I would be 
protected by a court order.’46  He did not even assume that the court might decide the other 
way and this is possibly because the court will only hear the one side of the story.
47
 
 The vast majority of women consent to caesarean section. Those who do not, 
presumably do so because they feel strongly about the whole procedure.  Some are justified, 
others are not.  It is easy when you have all the time in the world to decide that the needle 
phobia patient should have the operation because it protects her long term autonomy but the 
Nigerian woman should not.  Unfortunately, in such situations, time is not always available.  
If we allow doctors to invade a woman’s body when they feel they must, they will do so even 
though the baby might be born unharmed by natural delivery as well.  If we only allow 
women to decide, then there will be deaths that could be prevented.  None of the two 
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solutions will prevent tragedies 100%, but by having all the ethical and practical 
considerations in mind, it is safer to let the woman decide.  This author is in agreement with 
Herring
48
 that few pregnant women take a decision without taking into account the interests 
of the foetus.  However, objections can be raised to the solution he proposes: to ask what the 
ordinary woman would want.  Surely, this cannot be the solution.  If we were dealing with 
‘ordinary women,’ we would not be in this dilemma because the majority of them are very 
much willing to go through the operation to deliver a healthy child.  Therefore, such a test 
would completely ignore the woman’s wishes as it would always find against her.  
 As Lord Justice Thorpe
49
 pointed out: ‘[i]t is perhaps easier for an appellate court to 
discern principle than it is for a trial court to apply it in the face of judicial instinct, training 
and emotion.’50  This is apparent in another context as well: while the majority of scholars 
reach the conclusion that the woman’s autonomy should be protected, the majority of the 
courts dealing with hard facts reach the opposite conclusion.  It is much easier to talk of high 
values such as autonomy and self-determination when you know that what you say will not 
cost a human life.  The problem with accepting that courts are at least excused in wanting to 
protect the foetus’s life when faced with the opportunity is that there is a pattern in the cases 
where caesarean section is forced: Janet Gallagher quotes a survey: 81% of the women 
subjected to court orders in the US were black, Asian or Hispanic, 44% were unmarried, 24% 
did not speak English as their primary language and none was a private patient.
51
  This is 
because these women are less capable of conveying the reasoning of their decisions because 
of language barriers and cultural discrimination.  If the courts are to be given an opportunity 
to interfere, the test used must ensure that this is done fairly. 
 The proposed test therefore is to allow the woman to have the first and more 
influential say in this.  This is not because her autonomy is the paramount principle; on the 
contrary, it is because she is the person who has created the strongest bond with the foetus.  It 
is thus much more likely that the woman will have balanced all the factors and reached a 
better conclusion on what to do in such a difficult situation than a judge who has considered 
the matter for 20 minutes and does not have all the facts in front of him.  This test does not 
imply that the woman’s opinion will always prevail because we must not exclude the 
possibility that she truly does not have the capacity to decide whether to go through with the 
operation.  An example of that is Norfolk and Norwich Healthcare NHS Trust v W.
52
  The 
woman in this case was admitted to the hospital in a state of arrested labour but was denying 
the fact that she was pregnant.  The judge in this case correctly decided that she was not in a 
position to decide whether she could have the operation.  Nevertheless, in the majority of 
cases, the woman will be competent, will have thought of the implications of her decision in 
advance and her decision and justifications will have to be respected.  This means that the 
competence test will have to be applied to her just like it would be applied to any other 
person, with one modification.  The woman should not be able to refuse treatment for no 
reason at all
53
 because that would suggest that she has not carried out the balancing exercise 
this suggestion requires.  However, if the woman provides a reason, that reason should be 
respected.  This would mean that some foetuses might die for reasons that the majority does 
not understand and does not agree with.  At the same time, the relationship between the 
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doctor and the woman must also be one of trust and not only of protection: the doctor must 
trust that the woman took her decision responsibly, balancing not only the advantages for her 
but her future child as well.  Surely, no one can do this better than her. 
 
 
C THE POLICING OF WOMEN DURING PREGNANCY DEBATE 
 
1  Arguments For and Against a Tougher Approach 
 
Having decided that one cannot morally or legally impose an obligation on a woman to have 
a caesarean section simply because she is pregnant, one needs to discuss whether she has any 
obligations during the nine months of the pregnancy itself. The court in St George’s NHS 
Trust v S 
54
 stated that ‘while pregnancy increases the personal responsibilities of a woman, it 
does not diminish her entitlement to decide whether or not to undergo medical treatment.’55  
If one agrees with the second part of the statement, it is not entirely clear what is meant by 
the first.  What added ‘personal responsibilities’ exist in the case of a pregnant woman?  In a 
number of jurisdictions, courts have found third parties liable for harm done (even to non-
viable) foetuses.
56
  It is thus at least arguable that the same responsibility should exist for the 
primary carer of the foetus, the pregnant woman herself.  However, this is a question where 
ethics should determine the law and not the other way round.  Thus, the question should not 
be what the courts will decide, but what they should decide.  Finally, one should consider, if 
the woman has legally enforceable obligations during the gestation period, what sanctions 
should attach on them? 
 By ‘personal responsibilities’ one can mean any number of obligations: some doctors 
believe that daily walking and listening to classical music helps the foetus develop into a 
healthier baby,
57
 smoking and drinking alcohol are not illegal activities but they are strongly 
recommended against by doctors
58
 and drug abuse is both illegal and destructive for the 
foetus’s health.59  Therefore, should pregnant women be policed in their actions and if so, 
where do we draw the line?  This essay will only deal with the most difficult issue: is a 
pregnant woman who is addicted to drugs morally culpable and/or legally punishable for the 
death or serious injury of her child?  
 In most cases, the critical period of the foetus’s development is between the third and 
the twelfth week of the pregnancy but some organs, including the brain, develop throughout 
the nine months.
60
 One could argue that even though the infringement on the woman’s 
privacy in this case is much more prolonged than in the forced caesarean section situation, 
her autonomy is not violated to the same extent.  Justification for that is derived from 
Dworkin’s Odysseus example mentioned in the first section: in that case, paternalism and 
Odysseus’ long term autonomy were aligned.  Similarly, in this case, it is in the best interest 
of the woman to stop using drugs whether she is pregnant or not.  The State already infringes 
an addict’s autonomy by criminalising such behaviour; now the law simply becomes more 
restrictive because there is another life at stake.  One should thus look at the policing of 
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pregnancy debate not in terms of conflict between the mother and the foetus, but in terms of 
shared interests and obligations owed by society to both of them.
61
 
 In a different context, Bonnie Steinbock
62
 argued that drink driving is always immoral 
because even though the alcoholic has no control over his desire for the substance, he has 
control on whether to drive a car.  Here, it could be argued that a pregnant addict is not acting 
as immorally as the alcoholic driver.  Unlike her husband who can leave the room to have a 
cigarette, or the alcoholic who can take a taxi, she cannot separate herself, thus her actions, 
from the foetus.  That does not mean that by taking drugs she is not acting immorally, it 
merely suggests that not everyone is as culpable as our initial reactions would suggest.  
Bewley
63
 suggests that the way to determine the culpability of the woman is to balance what 
she is sacrificing against what harm she is preventing.  She gives the example of soft cheese: 
doctors believe that some soft cheese has adverse effects on the embryo.  She thus argues that 
a woman who fails to stop eating gorgonzola is much more morally culpable that a woman 
who cannot get off her heroin addiction.  Although this is persuasive on the facts of the 
example, it can lead to problematic conclusions since it suggests that the same effort is 
required from each individual to stop using drugs.  In reality, two women who have been 
taking the same drug for the same time will not behave in the same way during rehabilitation 
because drug taking is largely connected with psychological and not only physical factors.
64
  
Therefore, such a test for culpability would lead to the unfair situation of putting addict 
women in groups of more and less blameworthy people depending on their emotional status 
at the time. 
 The argument in favour of policing pregnancy is that the woman has impliedly agreed 
that she would deliver the foetus not only alive, but to the best of her powers, healthy.  As the 
court put it in Smith v Brennan, ‘a child has a legal right to begin life with a sound mind and 
body’.65  She therefore has a moral obligation as a mother to stop possible harmful actions. 
Coupled with that, is the argument that the same obligation is imposed on her by society 
which has an interest in protecting its children and ensuring that they will suffer from the 
minimum possible harm.  The fact that the pregnant woman has already gone through 
enormous sacrifices for the foetus should not matter; taking drugs is one of the factors that 
makes her automatically morally liable for harming the foetus.  
 Having mentioned society’s obligations towards the foetus however, one should not 
forget that it also has obligations towards the woman.  These include an obligation to protect 
women’s rights, rights that have only been recognised in the last part of the twentieth century 
and are still not well cemented.  Feminists are thus justifiably worried that policing 
pregnancy will take us back to the days when ‘enslavement of women was justified as 
biological destiny.’66  If we can force women to stop taking drugs or smoking on policy 
grounds, then an employer who fires a pregnant woman from a more risky working 
environment on grounds of protecting the foetus might have an arguable case. Following 
from that, it is not difficult to imagine a situation whereby women of child bearing age 
(which is most of their life) are stopped from working in more dangerous environments.  This 
becomes even more discriminatory because studies show that long term exposure of a man to 
hazardous conditions does not make him infertile as was originally thought, but can affect the 
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quality of his sperm.
67
  Clearly a woman is more connected to the foetus than the man, but 
both contribute it its health condition.  Where is the line between protecting the foetus and 
discriminating against the woman drawn? 
 
 
2  What are the Possible Approaches the Law Could Take? 
 
A right means nothing if it cannot be enforced.  If the foetus has such a right, what actions 
will the future child or society itself be able to take against the woman?  There are a number 
of options, but arguably the most effective punishment or deterrent will be the woman’s 
knowledge that she is hurting her child.  One should therefore consider whether the threat of 
going to prison for manslaughter could convince a woman to stop taking drugs.  There are 
already criminal sanctions against drug-taking but they have proven ineffective as deterrents.  
After all, anyone who understands the situation in which a heroin addict is found, must know 
that the woman does not really ‘want’ to take the drugs, she ‘needs’ to.  She wants to save her 
child but her need for heroin might be stronger.  Similarly then, she might want to avoid 
imprisonment, but that will not stop her from desiring the drug.  In the words of Bewley, ‘a 
woman who cannot give up drugs despite her best intent does not have a free will.  This is a 
double tragedy, as she harms her foetus against her will, and her will is not free and 
autonomous.’68  
 Moreover, it is questionable whether the threat of imprisonment hanging over the 
head of a pregnant woman will have the desired effects.  It is more likely to make her worried 
and lead her to drugs once more for consolation.  Also, if it becomes known that pregnant 
addicts are prosecuted and imprisoned, women are more likely to avoid seeing the doctor in 
the first place.  This means not only that they will give birth at home without the help of an 
expert, but also that the development of the foetus during the nine months will not be 
monitored.
69
 Problematically, it is these vulnerable foetuses that need the most attention.  
Thus, if our main aim is to protect the foetus rather than punish the woman, criminalising her 
cannot be the solution.  Nevertheless, it should not be excluded as an option.  It should be 
used as a last resort where there is evidence that the mother was offered adequate care for her 
condition, yet she refused to use it accordingly. 
 Criminalising pregnant addicts is not only theoretically difficult to justify, but also 
creates practical considerations in its application.  Roth argues that a study of women in 
Florida including private and public hospitals found that alcohol and drug abuse are common 
amongst women regardless of their race and socioeconomic status.
70
  Despite this, black 
women are nearly ten times more likely to be reported than white women and nearly all 
women who were reported were of low socioeconomic status.
71
  Therefore, women in 
minorities and of low socioeconomic status are more likely to be targeted, convicted and 
further harmed in prison, creating a vicious circle of drug problems and troubled families in 
specific sectors of society.  A child whose mother is in prison or has been released but is still 
addicted to heroin is more likely to be raised more poorly than a child in a normal family 
unit.  Sentencing therefore is not only harming pregnant women, but their babies as well, the 
very people who we were trying to protect in the first place.  A study for pregnancy and 
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alcohol use showed that women who consumed three drinks a day but ate a balanced diet, had 
a foetal alcohol syndrome of 4.5% while those who drank the same amount but were 
malnourished had a foetal alcohol syndrome rate of 71%.
72
  Daniels therefore persuasively 
argues that since malnutrition ties directly to income, ‘Foetal alcohol syndrome is a measure 
not only of maternal alcoholism but also of economic class.’73  Clearly, punishing the woman 
rather than providing help for her, except in the most exceptional circumstances, cannot be in 
her best interests, her baby’s, or society’s.  
 A second type of remedy could be a civil action whereby the child would be able to 
claim compensation for injuries induced during the gestation period due to the mother’s drug 
taking habits.  An action in tort will have the advantage of the court deciding whether it is 
‘fair, just and reasonable’74 to award damages.  This will again depend on the efforts put by 
the woman to stop taking drugs and whether they were genuine or not.  On the other hand, an 
action for damages is unlikely to be very effective since a drug addict rarely has money to 
pay for a potential law suit.  Additionally, this action will not have protected the foetus 
although, if the mother pays, it is likely that it will make the child’s life easier in terms of 
potential medical treatment he is likely to need due to the injuries induced.  Therefore, such 
an option should be available to the child although it is appreciated that it will only be 
effective in exceptional circumstances. 
 The final remedy would be to take the child away from the mother immediately after 
birth.  Even thought this cannot prevent the original harm from happening, it will avoid any 
further harm.  However, the baby should not be automatically taken away from the mother 
simply because she was using drugs during pregnancy.  This should only be done in cases 
where the baby is still in danger because the parent is still using drugs.  This is a frustratingly 
inadequate response: it is recognised that there will be cases in which children will be left in 
the hands of parents who might go back to their drug-taking habits.  However, the alternative 
would be to prevent a woman who has stopped using drugs for the sake of her child from 
raising it.  The possibility of forcing a woman to stop taking drugs will not be discussed in 
detail since no one can force an addict off such a habit unless the addict herself wants to.  If 
she does not want to stop taking the drugs herself, she will return back to her old habits as 
soon as she leaves the rehabilitation centre and the State will have wasted money that could 
have been used on a more willing woman instead.  
 
 
3  The Middle Solution 
 
It seems therefore, that the only adequate way to protect a foetus is through the education and 
awareness-raising of its environment.  If society can punish a woman because it has an 
interest to protect the foetus, then some self-criticism is also necessary due to its failure to act 
proactively to protect this interest.  It needs to provide proper nutrition, counselling, 
substance abuse and mental health services and more generally adequate health care.  It is of 
course much easier to blame someone else altogether rather than take partial responsibility 
for a problematic situation.  Sending a woman to prison is easier to implement than 
proactively providing the necessary help for her.  However, in the long run, such tactics will 
work for the best interest of society.  If incentives are given to addicts to come forward rather 
than having to spend resources to track them down, prosecute and put them to prison, society 
will not only be gaining the invaluable intangible benefits of prevention of a death, but 
economic advantages as well.  The Institute of Medicine in the USA concluded that for each 
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dollar spent on prenatal care, $3.38 was being saved.
75
  Furthermore, arguments from both 
sides make it appear that this is an either/or debate: either the mother’s autonomy is protected 
or the foetus’s right to life.  Unlike the caesarean section debate, this is not the case here.  
Encouraging women to come forward on their own is the most appropriate middle solution. 
 Evidence suggests that even when prenatal care is available, many high risk pregnant 
women avoid it.
76
  This derives partly from the fact that a number of drug addicts feel 
rejected by society and are therefore less likely to trust the authorities.  Another part of the 
problem is that many women do not realise the extent to which they are hurting the foetus 
and that something can be done to stop this.  It is thus important that awareness-raising 
campaigns take place and that the State carries out the appropriate marketing to attract 
estranged women.  Daniels
77
 criticises the US government for presenting discriminatory 
advertisements because public health care warnings are often produced in Spanish, typically 
show African-American and Latina women and are directed the at inner-city neighbourhoods.  
However, arguably this is not discriminatory, just an effective way of targeting the most 
appropriate audience.  It is submitted that these minorities, especially the women, are less 
likely to be aware of the advantages of appropriate healthcare due to language barriers and 
because they do not have easy access to such information.  Inner-city neighbourhoods are 
where the majority of such high risk pregnant women live.  A poster’s aim is to make an 
immediate impression on the person whom it tries to affect; that includes the person being 
able to identify with the picture and understanding the words.  At a time when conservative 
estimations show 41,000 ‘crack babies’ a year78 being born in the US alone, such criticisms 
are deflecting our attention from the main issue of saving lives. 
 However, one criticism can be successfully be made about such awareness raising 
campaigns: they exclusively target women.  This discussion has so far only dealt with the 
policing of pregnant women, but one should not forget that a pregnant woman does not live 
in isolation from the rest of the world.  One New Jersey public health advertisement showed a 
pregnant woman holding a drink and warned that ‘A pregnant woman never drinks alone’.  
As Daniels points out however, ‘a pregnant woman also never drinks in isolation from the 
effects of her home, her physical, social and political environment.’79  Society cannot expect 
pregnant women to quit smoking when it does not warn future fathers that their child could 
be facing health problems due to the fact that their wife is a passive smoker during her 
pregnancy.  Similarly, it is unfair and discriminatory to talk of foetuses being ‘exposed to 
illicit drugs in the womb’80 when no one attributes fault to the male partner who could be 
using drugs for years.  This attitude is partly due to the fact that for many years it was 
believed that if a man damaged his sperm by taking drugs he simply became infertile.  This is 
no longer the case.
81
  As our understanding of foetal development progresses so should our 
responses towards it.  If society is willing to police pregnant women on the grounds of public 
policy, it should at least make men aware that they have roles and responsibilities before the 
baby is born as well.
82
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D CONCLUSION 
  
Ethical considerations are very important in the policing of pregnant women debate both 
during and at the very end of the gestation period.  However, practical considerations are 
what make the difference.  Pregnant women are treated differently not because they are less 
human than everyone else, but because they choose to carry out the greatest gift their human 
nature has given them.  High values such as autonomy, right to life, self-determination, 
privacy, come down to one thing: saving lives.  A life however is not only destroyed when 
one stops breathing; it is also destroyed when she feels she has sacrificed her religion for the 
sake of her child or when she has sacrificed her child for the sake of drugs.  Thus, a woman 
should be able to decide whether to go through with the caesarean section or not as long as 
she makes it clear that she has thought of the consequences of her decision for her and her 
foetus.  Only if this test is not satisfied should society be permitted to intervene.  Similarly, if 
the woman is an addict, she should be given the opportunity to ask for help and when she 
does, it should be made available; only then should more coercive measures be used.  Society 
has an obligation to help its members; but it is often forgotten that pregnant women are as 
much members of our society as future babies.  The only feasible way to strike a balance 
between society’s two conflicting obligations is to give the woman the primary responsibility 
and only act in extreme situations.  This of course will not always be 100% satisfactory, but 
no blanket rule either in favour of the mother or the child can achieve a better result. 
 
 
